Address Delivered Before the Bar Association of Riverside County Entitled  Will These Decisions Stand? by unknown
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
The Jesse Carter Collection The Jesse Carter Collection
9-29-1954
Address Delivered Before the Bar Association of
Riverside County Entitled "Will These Decisions
Stand?"
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter
Part of the Judges Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in The Jesse Carter Collection by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Address Delivered Before the Bar Association of Riverside County Entitled "Will These Decisions Stand?"" (1954). The Jesse Carter
Collection. Paper 20.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter/20
/)it,. ... -~".~ 
~.. .. ~ -
ADDRESS DELIVERED BY JESSE W. CARTER, 
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, 
BEFORE THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, 
RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA, ON SEPTEMBER 29TH. 1954, 
ENTITLED "WILL THESE DECISIONS STAND?" 
-- -
On the fourth floor of the State BuIld.ing in San 
Francisco where the Supreme Court of California haa its 
headquarters, there is a long hallway where the photographs ot 
allot the Justices of the Supreme Court are hung In accordance 
with the era in which they served. As I walk down this hallway 
to my office which Is near the tar end, I occasionally glance 
at these pictures and the thought comes into my mind that it . 
will only be a matter of time until my successor will be dOing 
the same thing -- when all that will remain as far as I am 
concerned, will be the picture on the wall and what I have 
written which has been printed in the California Reports 
Sometimes I wonder why I should continue with the struggle ot 
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attempting to prepare oplnlona which will meet with the approval 
of a majority ot my associate8 or write dissenting opinions when 
I cannot agree with the vi.ws expressed by them. At times it 
seemB that all the great problema which have been decided by my 
predecessors were ot small import compared to those which are 
presented to our Court today. and I pause and retlect upon the 
question ot what solution would have been reached had these same 
problems been submitted to those who sat before me on the Court. 
As I view the kaleidoscope ot the past. many ot those who have 
preceded me pass in review. I see Hastings. F1eld. Terry. 
Wallace. McFarland. Beattie, Angelotti, Shaw, W1lbur and many 
others sitting where I now sit. Allot these men were faced 
with the current problems ot the day and the reported decisions 
reveal the care with wh1ch they met and disposed ot the questions 
confronting themo During various periods there were strong 
difterences ot opinion between members of the Court on 
fundamental principles and I sometimes speculate on what changes 
might have taken place 1n our political, economic and social 
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structure had the views ot the minor1ty. rather than those ot the 
majorlty, prevalled. As we read the reported declsions in the 
llght ot present dal conditione. we have a clearer concept or 
what would have been the w1seat course to pursue at that t1me and 
I wonder at tlmes wb7 tba t course was not pursued by a major! t7 
ot that long ago court. 
We know from a reading ot the Cal1fornia Reports that 
many dec1slons whlch seemed to r.ve a sound basis when they were 
rendered were later overruled or 80 mod1fled or d1st1ngui8hed 
that they ceased to have any authoritatIve value, and 80 I have 
dec1ded to speak to you tonight relatlve to some ot the recent 
decisions ot the supreme Court ot Oalifornia and to otter the 
bold predict10n that these decis10ns wlll not stand the test ot 
time 
The cases which I shall discuss, have, I believe. when 
viewed dispassionately, some very rid1culous aspects, not only 
so tar &s the law is concerned, but so tar &8 the logical 
consequences are concerned. With all due apologies to my good 
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friend. ErIe Stanley Gardner. the cases which I intend to talk 
about tonight could have. and should have. the type ot title 
used by him 1n his myster, novels 
The first ot these caaes. Pickens v. Johnson (42 Cal. 
ad 399) should really be called the "CASE OP THE REAPPEARING 
JUDGE." In that case it appeared J. O. Moncur was elected in 
1944 as Judge of the Superior Court ot Plumas County for the 
full term ot six years which he served until the 1aat day ot his 
term when he retired pursuant to the provisions ot the Judge's 
Retirement Act (stats. 1937. p. 2204). Atter hia term expired. 
Judge Moncur was assigned to sit 1n the Superior Court ot 
Sacramento County by the chairman ot the Judicial Council. and 
presided at the trial ot that case. Section 6 ot the Retirement 
Act provides that "Justices and judges retired under the 
provisions ot this act. so long as they are entItled by ita 
provisions to receive a retirement allowance. shall be Judicial 
officers ot the state. but shall not exercise any ot the 
powers ot a JustIce or Judge except while under assignment to a 
~-
court a8 hereinafter provided. Any such retired justice or judge
may, with his own consent~ be as8igned by the Chairman or the
JUdicial Council in a court ot like jurisdict10n as. or higher
jurisdiction than. that court from which he has retired; and
while so assigned shall have all the powera o~ a justice or judge
thereot.
It a8signed to 8it in a court. he shall be paid while
sitting therein in addition to his retirement allowances the
dltterence# ir any, between hie retirement allowance and the
compensation of a judge of the court to which he i8 assigned." At
one time thi8 section was amended to provide that the counsel ror
all concerned must stipulate that the retired judge could act.
One ofbut that provision was later omitted by another amendment.
the parties contended that this section was unconstitutional and
that any judgment rendered by Judge Moncur whIle so sitting was
void.
A majority ot the Supreme court, relying upon section
22a or Article IV or the Const1tution. declined to hold that
Section 22&.section 6 of the Retirement Act was unconstitutional.
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so tar as here pertinent. provides that "The Legi8lature shall
have power to provide tor the payment of retirement salaries to
employees ot the state who shall quali.ty there.tor b'H service in
the work ot the State a. provided bY' law. The Legislature shall
have power to fix and from time to time change the requirements
and conditions tor a retirement which shall Include a ~nImum
per1od ot service. a min1mum attained age and m1nimum
contribution of funds by such employees and such other condition.
"&s the LegIslature may prescribe. ...
Using the section Just quoted. the majority o~ the
Supreme Court reasoned that the Legislature could validly provide
that a retired judge.. as a condItion to retIrement. !DUet con8Ider
himself available tor assignment as a judge when called for
Judic1al service by the chairman of the Judicial Council. It was
concluded that he was a de jure judge in a de jure judicial
office; that his assignment was valid; that section 6 of the
Retirement Act was constitutional and that nothing more need be
said concerning the matter.
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Naturally. I dissented. I pointed out that 
Constitution prov1des that Judges ot the superior court shall be 
elected by the voters ot that part10ular county (Art. VI, sec. 6); 
that 1n the event ot a vacanc7 1n the ott1ce. the Governor may 
app01nt a person to hold ottice until the commencement or the 
term ot a person elected to hold that ott1ce; that the term ot 
ottice 1s six years (Art. VI, sec. 8). I also pOinted out that 
under these provisions 1t has been held that a purported Judicial 
act done by a judge atter his term of otfice has expired has no 
force or effect (Martello v. Superlor Court, 202 cal. 400; 
Connolly v. Ashworth, 98 Cal. 205; Mace v. O'Reilley, 70 Cal. 231; 
Broder v. Conklin, 98 Cal. 360; People v. Ruet, 14 CaloAppo 516); 
that the Leg1slature cannot extend the term ot a Judge fixed by 
the Constitutlon (People v. Campbell, 138 Cal. ll} People v. 
Markham, 104 Cal. 232); nor conter upon hlm Judlclal power atter 
his term has expired, where the Constltutlon fixes his term of 
office and mode ot aelectlon (Hallam v. Tillinghast, 19 Wash. 20, 
52 P. 329). 
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There are vital difterences between the duties ot 
lawyers and Judges. When a lawyer 1. elected or appointed to a 
Judioial posU;lon. he i. automatical11 retired tJ!llOll membership 
in the state Bar ot Californla and his payment ot dues thereto 
18 suspended during the tlme he remains on the Bench. A lawyer 
Is an advocate, a partisan, a confident tal adv1sor ot h1s 
cllents. A Judge is non-part1san -- he is required to welgh 
and consider the evldence, the law, and render tair and impartial 
decisions. Different codes ot ethlcs apply; certaln 
constitutional provlsions apply to judges or Justlces. When a 
Judge retires or is deteated when runnIng tor reelectIon, he i. 
agaln a lawyer subject to the state Bar Act; he m&7 again have 
cllents; he 1s agaln an advocate and a partIsan It he so 
deslres. 
Under the majorIty holdIng in the Plckens case, we 
have a lawyer subject to the state Bar Act who. despIte all 
constltutional mandates to the contr&r1. may assume judlclal 
dutles, may thwart the wl11 ot the People by actlng as a Judge 
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although not validly reeleoted by them. may have dutiea as a 
lawyer to perform tor certa1n clienta, and Judicial dutIes to 
pertorm tor law;ere . who mal in his private lalqer'. 11te, be hie 
oppoait1on. Such a JUdge has not been elected by the voters; he 
baa not been appoInted by the Governor; he has been aaslgned;· bl 
the chairman ot the Judicial Counc1l because a major1tJ ot the 
Supreme Court bas held that the Legislature may interfere with 
the tunctionlng ot the judlQlal department ot th1s state 1n clear 
v1olation ot the express constItutional mandate provlding tor a 
separation ot powera -- into the executive, Judic1al and 
legislative branches ot the government. 
Money received a8 retirement compensation 1s because ot 
past services rendered and It was not contemplated that It should 
also be received because services might be required in the tuture. 
When a man retIres, the usual meaning plaoed on that ret1rement 
18 that he wanta to have leisure t1mein wh1ch to enJol that 
whlch he has earned In the past. A majoritl ot the court, however, 
have now held by a strained, unreasonable, and wholly unwarranted, 
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construction ot sectlon 22& ot Article IV ot the Constitution ot 
this state that the Legislature m&7 provide that his compensation 
is partially baaed on his implied agreement to be subject to 
call, or aSSignment, b7 the chairman ot the JUd1eial Council. 
Wh1le the present act provides tor his consent to such aSSignment, 
it is obvious that the Legislature may elim1nate this requirement. 
The 10g1cal consequence ot the holding is that a 
ret1red judge may not know trom one day to the next whether he Is 
a lawyer or a judicial officer ot the state. What happens when a 
retired Judge. once more a law,er. subject to the state Bar Act 
and payment ot dues thereunder. is ass1gned to a Judicial 
position? Are his state Bar duesretunded to hlm? what happens 
to his clients it he i8 actively engaged In the pract1ce of law? 
with whom Is hi. loyalty -- his clients or lawyers who appear 
before him? Is he subject to both jud1cial and attorney's Codes 
ot Ethlcs and whlch prevails 1n the event at a conflict? 
The etfect at the majority holding In the P1ckens case 
ls that retlred judges or justices even though the1r respective 
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terms ot otflce have explred are atl1l Judlc1&l oftlcers ot the 
state. This is clearly contrary to the holding ot the Supreme 
Court ot Ca1ltorn1a In the 80-cal1ed Hardy case (state Bar ot 
Cal1fornia v. Superlor Court. 203 cal. 323). In that caae you 
w1l1 recall JUdge Carlos Hardy accepted a love otterlng ot 
$2.500 trom Aimee Semple MacPherson while he was superior Judge 
ot Los Angeles County. Mrs. MacPherson said It was tor legal 
advice given her, and the state Bar sought to discipline Judge 
Hardy who claimed that he was not subject to the j1ll'isdiction ot 
the state Bar because he was not engaged in the practice ot law. 
and the Supreme Court ot Calitorn1a upheld his position. So 
then we have the unique s1tuation ot a judge whose term haa 
expired and who 1s entitled to retirement pay and also entitled 
to practlce law beIng a judlcial off1cer ot the state and subject 
to asslgnment by the chalrman ot the Judicial Council to sit in 
any superior court or court ot hlgher Jurisdictlon In the state. 
What serious consequences may tlow trom conflicts which may 
arise out ot situations ot this character are Impossible to 
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foresee. but they may be· devious and tar-reaching and have a serious 
detrimental eftect upon the administration ot justice in this 
state. NotWithstanding the holding 1n the Pickens case that a 
retired judge or justice whose term of office has expired is a 
judicial officer of the state. the Supreme Court of Calito~nia 
recently held that when a superior judge is injured In the course 
ot his duty the county which elected him is liable tor the 
benefits to which he is entitled under the Workmen's Compensation 
Act. Can we not visualize a retired judge from one of the 
mountain counties being assigned to sit in Los Angeles and while 
there under assignment being killed or seriously injured and 
either he or his dependents entItled to benefits under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. Where wl11 the burden tall' Your 
guess Is as good as mlne. Thus ends the "CASE OF THE REAPPEARING 
JUDGE"! 
Next we have the "CASE OF THE m!,PRIVILEGED CITIZEN. n 
In Prlce agalnst the Atchison, Topeka and santa Fe (42 Cal.2d 
517) we were concerned with a plalntift injured on two different 
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oo0&8ion& while emplo7ed bJ the detendant railroad cOmpanJ in 
interstate commerce. Both acc1dents occurred 1n New Mex1co. 
Detendant pleaded a8 a special detense the doctrlne ot forum non 
conveniena and moved under that doctr1ne to dIsmlss the actlon. 
The tr1al oourt granted defendant's motion and entered Judgment 
ot dlsmissal ot pla1ntift's causes of actlon. The plalnt1ft 
appealed. A majority ot the Supreme Court ot cal1forn1a 
aft1rmed the judgment ot dismissal on two d1fferent grounds. It 
d1scussed the inconvenience and expense to the detendant ot 
presentlng ita detense to plaIntIff's actlon in the Los Angeles 
court; and it discussed the great burden upon the courts and 
people ot this state in hearing and determInIng cases ot this 
character. We had held in Leet v. Union Paciflc (25 Ca1.2d 605) 
that the doctrine ot torum non conveniens was no Justitication 
for a state court to refuse JurisdictIon ot an actIon under the 
Federal Employers' Liabil1ty Act; that it was conclusive that 
the state court must take Jurisdiction having no choice in the 
matter. Our decision was based upon the holding ot the Supreme 
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Court ot the United states in Miles v. Illinois Central R. R. 
~o •• (315 U.S. 698). The maJorlty. however. relled upon the 
later case ot Southern R. Co. v. Mayfield (340 u.s. 1) declded 
by the Supreme Court ot the Unlted state. 1n 1950. which held 
that the Miles case did not limit the power ot the state to den, 
access to ita courts to persona seeking recovery under the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act it in similar cases the state ..... 
tor reasons ot local policy denies resort to its courts and 
enforces 1ts policy 1mparttally so as not to involve a 
discrimination against Employers' Liability Act sults and not to 
ottend against the Privileges and Immunities Clause ot the 
Constitution. OUr Court held that the argument that the doctrine 
should not apply because ot the tact that an action tiled by a 
nonresident oit1zen might be barred by the statutes ot lim1tation 
was without mer1t. The majority said: "It plaintiff chooses 
without justification to bring his action under circumstances 
warranting application ot the doctrine it is a deliberate risk 
assumed by him and he must be prepared to meet any 1088es 
-14-
8ustained a8 a result"; that he could have obv1ated this 
ditf1culty by til1ng in a federal d1strict court where the action 
would be subject to transfer rather than dismissalo 
Again, I dIssented. I p01nted out that a statute, or 
court-made l"Ule ot law which would perm! t a trial court to dismiss 
an action brought by a c1tIzen ot another state upon a cause ot 
action ar1sing out ot this state would be invalid as violative 
ot the prIvileges and 1mmunities clause ot the federal 
Const1tution unless it was applied equally against citizens ot 
this state. I also poInted out that Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line 
R. Co., (345 u.s. 379) decided by the UnIted states Supreme Court 
1n 1953 ca~considerable doubt upon the holding in the Maytield 
case relied upon by the majorIty. The pope case held that the 
statute (28 U.S.C.A •• § l404(a» author1zIng a federal district· 
court to transter a federal employers' l1ability act10n to another 
federal court on the ground ot convenIence dId B2! confer power 
to enjoIn on a state court. It by reasonot the 11ability act 
which gives a rIght to the Injured person to sue 1n the state 
-15-
cOUPta. one state court carmot enJoln another. a state torum 
should' not be empowered to dlsmi •• tor inconvenlenoe. 
I teel that another reason ex1ated. tor retuains to 
app17 the inconvenience doctrine and that was that we had 
repeatedly held that a court baa & mandatop;v duty to consider 
and determine on the merita all cases over whlch it has 
Jurlsdlotlon (Gering v. SuperIor Court. 37 cal.2d. 29. Robln.on 
v. SuperIor Court, 35 Cal.2d 319; Turealcy v. SuperIor Court, 
91 Cal.App.2d 838; CIty ot San Dlego v. Andrews, 195 Cal. 111) 
and that the court does and should exerclse JurIsdlctlon In 
transltory causes ot actIon arlaing elaewhere (McKee v. Dodd. 
152 Cal. 637. 'Ryan v. Horth Alaska Salmon co •• 153 Cal. 438). 
We have specifically stated (Miller v. Municipal Court, 22 Cal. 
2d 818). rolloving a decislon by the Supreme Court ot the United 
states, that inconvenience attords no reason ror declining 
jurisdiction conferred by law. The existence ot the jurisdiction 
create8 an implication ot duty to exercise It, and that its 
exercise may be onerous does not milItate against that 
implIcatIon. 
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The maJoritJ hold1ng does tor the railroad compan1es 
what they have not been able to get Congress or the Legislature 
to do tor them. Chiet JU8tIce Warren when Governor ot this 
state, vetoed two b1lls which sought to introduce In th1a state 
the doctrine ot forum non conveniens. He sa14 In hls veto 
message: "It we are to Whlttle away in th1s manner the benefits 
conterred by the Federal Employers' L1abillty Act. it would soon 
lose its natlonal unitormlty and could at lea8t substantially 
weaken the purposes tor whlch the act was or1ginally des1gnated. 
At all events it any ot the provisions ot the act result 
in a denial ot Justlce to e1ther plalntitts or detendants. the 
situation could be remedied nationwide by & simple act of 
Congress." The holding ot our court 18 not limited to Federal 
Employers' Llability Act cases but to transitory out-ot-state 
causes ot actlon. even when brought by a cltizen ot this state. 
so far as the consequences ot the majorIty holdIng are 
concerned. it puts upon the plaintift the risk ot ehoosing the 
right torum. According to the majority. this is immaterial. 
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I say it is harsh indeed. A plaint1tr i8 forced to speculate not 
onlJ on how the trial court mar de01de the que.tion but also what 
the view. or an appellate court mar be. Suppose a case where the 
looation ot the witne •• es 18 equallJ divi4e4 between the state ot 
the chosen rorum aDd another or other tactors are equally 
balanced. The plaintift has no means ot predIctIng the court'. 
decisIon. He is left at the mercy ot the defendant and in redlty 
must have hIs prIor approval ot a partIcular court. Plaintirt 
haVing the right to have a partIcular court exercise ita 
jurisdiction. and that court having jurisdiction. should be able 
to have the diam1ssal denied in any case where the statute ot 
lImitations will have run by the time that issue ~~s tinally 
determined. 
The questIon presented was one ot great magnitude. It 
involved conSiderations of public policy of great importance not 
only to those who might wish to prosecute out-of-state causes of 
action in our courts. but to our courts as well. considering the 
impact upon our court procedure ot numerous motions to dismiss 
-18-
such actions in tr1al courts. aDd a review bl our appellate 
court. ot rulinsa on such motions, i8 bound to create perplexing 
problema. It seemed to me that 1t the doc trine ot torum non 
conven1ena was to be adopted 1n this state. it should have been 
by legi8lation Where ample eateguards oould bave been provided 
to protect those p1aint1tts Who 1n good falth and atter proper 
adv1ce. sought redress 1n our courts tor out-of-state causes ot 
actlon. Bad such a statute been enacted .. It would undoubtedl:f 
have embraced rules or procedure to gulde the courts 1n the 
applicat10n or the doctrine. 
1 should polnt out to you that this 1s the t1rst holdIng 
ot Itsk1nd In th1s state although man:.r Federal Employers' 
Liabi11ty cases have been decided here as well as other out-ot-
state causes ot actlon. Heretofore 1t had been held that the 
courts must exerc1ae their undoubted Jurisdlct10n 1n all casea 
ind1scrim1nately. 
The next two eases might very well be called the 
"CASES OF THE DISAPPOIN'l'ED WIVES." In Zaragosa v. Craven 
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(33 Oal.ad 315) a wite was held barred from recovering tor her 
personal 1n~le. becaus. ot her huaband'. oontrlbutor, 
negligence 1n the accident where ahe was injured by the 
detendant· 8 negligence. The conclusion __ 8&14 to tol10w. 
logically. troa the oomm:unity propert}r la_ ot thi. state which 
glve to the huband the management and oontrol ot the communlty. 
To permit the wite to recover tor her personal inJuriea wa. sald 
to be a perm1ss10n to the husband to protlt from h1s own wrong. 
I palnted out ln a dlesentlng opinion tbat the communIt}r property 
laws In Calitornia provide tbat all property acqulred by the 
apouses during marrlage other than that acqulred by gitt. devlse 
or descent, was property belonging to the commun1ty. I sald that 
the wite brought her body to the marriage and that it was her 
personal property and that she was certainly entltled to retain 
control over it and to recover damages tor its loss. or injury 
a8 the result ot another's negligence where she was not at tault. 
I quoted extensively trom William de Funia~'a Principles ot 
CommunI ty Property. Mr. de Funiak. an acknowledgEd author 1 ty on 
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the pr1Dolplea ot communlt, propertJ. said that except 
clearl1 made to the marital communltJ. c01DD1UnltJ propert,J on17 
cons18ts 0:1 that wbloh 18 aoqulred b;J onerous title. that 18. b7 
labor or Indust17 ot the spauaea. or which Is acquired 1n 
exchange tor communi tJ property. which. ot course. was acquired 
itselt by onerous t1tle. I pointed out that alnce the right ot 
actlon tor injury to the person is intended to repalr or make 
whole the inJ~. 80 tar as is possible In such a case. the 
compensation partakes ot the same character a8 that which has 
been Injured or suttered 108s. 
Suppose the case ot • wite who loses a leg. or an arm. 
in an automobile accident 1n which her husband. as driver ot 
the veh1c1e. was contributorl17 negligent. She is without &OJ 
right to recover because ot her husband's conduct even though 
the other partJ Involved may have been grossly negligent. Now 
suppose a case where either a husband. or wite. loses a leg or 
an arm and there i8 no contr1butory negligence involved. Under 
the present community property theory the recovery belongs to 
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the community. So tar as the husband is concerned" the theory 
does not have the P088Ibl11t" of workIng hardship and Inequit" 
as 1 t does where the wite 18 concerned. because it is he who has 
the management and control ot the community which includes any 
compensation tor Injur,J to the person ot either spouse. The 
bodies ot the spouses having been brought to the marriage a8 the 
separate property ot each. and ot neceaait" remalnlng such. 
should necessarily be the separate property ot the spouse injured. 
Atter the Zaragosa case had been declded by the 
Supreme Court ot California. the Supreme Court ot New Mexico had 
betore it a sim1lar caae. It~ however" held that the cause ot 
action tor the personal injury to the wlte. and tor the 
resultant pain and suttering, belonged to the wite and that the 
Judgment and ita proceeds were her separate propert". It was 
sald "She brought her body to the marrtage and on ita 
dlssolutlon 1a entitled to take it away; she 18 simllarly 
entitled to compensation trom one who has wrongfully vlolated 
her right to personal security.- In speaking ot the zaragoaa 
-22-
had ~ver said a. l<:lnd word fDr' the rua.Jorlty deelslon., it had 
I 
escaped thetr notice! It was also pointed out that under t;he 
or the 1n 
were a to 
and some driver or a motor v~hicle negligently struck her and 
the horse. throwing both into a renee. breaking the leg of each, 
the cause ot action for the damage to the horse would belong to 
the wIfe. but that tor the injury to her would belong to the 
community over wh1ch the husband had the management and controlo 
It was concluded that "We d(~ellne to adopt such a rule in New 
Mex1co~n 
Nevada also holds that compensation tor a personal 
In.1ury belongs to the person lnjured o (Fredrickson &:: Watson 
In 1951 the CalIfornia Leg1slature enacted section 111c 
of the Civil Code tor the obviOUS purpose of changing the rule 
announced 1n the ~arago8a caseg and while it is not altogether 
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aa clear a8 mi8ht be 4ea1re4. 1t waa a step in the rl8ht 
d1rect10n. This new sectlon has never been betore the Supreme 
Court ot California for construct10n 80 1t i8 too 800n to 
predict whether the legislative Intent10n has been made clear. 
Kesler v. Pabst (~3 A.C. 256) .as another case where 
the witets cause of action was barred because of the contrlbutory 
negligence ot the husband. The JU17 was Instructed that her 
husband's contr1butory negl1gence would be ~ted to her and 
bar her recovery. Subsequent to the acoident, the husband. had. 
by written instrument, rellnquished anJ interest in her cause ot 
action Which he might bave to her. It was held by the majority 
that thls purported relinquishment would not prevent the 
negligent husband trom protltlng by h1s own wrong. This 
conclusion was reached upon the theory that by h1s act ot 
rel1nquishment, the husband had sought to exercise control over 
his interest in the community cause ot action; that the right to 
dispose of property was a major Interest ot the owner and that 
to permit him to do so in such a 8ituation would create an 
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enforceable r1ght 1n his donee which had not theretofore 
eX1sted. 
I aga1n dissented. I pointed out that 1n an ear11er 
case decided bl the Supreme Court, 1'10res v. Brown, (39 0&1.24 
622,) the Court bad perm1tted the wUe to reoover .. despite her 
husband' 8 contr1butory negligence, where the husband had been 
killed 1n the accident which injured the wUe. I called to the 
Court's attention the undeniable fact that the cause of act10n 
tor personal injuries ar1ses at the t1me ot the ano1dent; and 
that the marr1age 1n the Piores case had not been d1ss01ved by 
death pr10r to the time the cause ot act10n ar08e. It the cause 
ot act10n in the Flores eaee was communi t7 propertJ.. then &117 
recovery theretor was a180 co1lll1u1l1 ty • In the Florea case. 
however, the Court allowed the wldow to recover, say1ng that to 
allow her to recover tor her personal 1nJuries wl11 in no way 
enrich Mr. Plores or those who might take through him. under 
this reasorUng Mrs. Floree would not ha:ve recovered had her 
husband 11ved. but through hls death he enabled hls w1dow to 
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receIve a beneflt she would not otherwlse have had because of hls 
contrlbutor,J negligence. By his death, he created in her an 
entorceab1e rlght that 4id not theretofore exist and in fact 
profited b,- hls own wrong. In the Flore. case, the re1lnquishment 
waa achieved by death atter the cauae of action arose; in the 
Kesler case, it wa. relinquished bl wrltten Instrument atter the 
cause ot actlon arose. 
The obvious questlon ariseal What wl11 happen when a 
husband and wlte, prior to any aCCident, relinqulsh to each 
other thelr respectlve rights and lnterests in any cause ot 
actlon whlch might possibly arlse 1n the future? What wl11 the 
Supreme Court ot california do then" ladies and gentlemen? 
Will we atll1 have the "CASE OF THE DISAPPOINTED WIVES"? 
At one time 1n this state, lawyers could, with 
reasonable certalnt,-, advise their c1lents who were havlng 
domestiC dlfflcult,-, how to provlde for a dlvlslon ot thelr 
communlty property and for support and malntenance ot the 
spouse" and expect that atter the court had approved the 
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agreement of the partles the terms and provIsIons thereot would 
be settled for all tlme 
Recently. the Supreme Court had betore it at the same 
time the casea ot Dexter v. Dexter (_2 ca1.2d 36); 1'ox v. 1'6x 
(_2 C&l.2d 49), and Flynn v. 1'lynn <_2 C&1.2d 55). In deciding 
those case8. lt would have been posaib1e tor the Court to 
olar1tJ. once and tor all, the contueion exlstlng 1n the property 
settlement and support and maintenance t'ie1d. A maJorlt)' ot' 
the Supreme court d14 not see tIt, however. to take advantage 
ot 'the opportunlt)' 80 presented and the three Jecisions rendered 
by it have added untold contusion. 
Ver,y brietly. and wlthout doing justlce to the subject. 
those three cases hold tha.t the. court .... pproved agreements made 
by the parties tor the division ot their community property and 
tor support and. maIntenance, even though incorporated into the 
decrees ot divorce. may. years later, be again looked at by the 
same. or another. trtal court tor it to determine. wIth the 
assIstance ot extrInsic ev1dence 1.t need be. whether or not the 
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parties real17 meant to prov1de tor a11rloDl'. rather thaD support. 
or whether mDnth17 payment. In 11eu ot a lump aum ~nt 
.ettlement at o01llDUn1t)t propertJ' rlsbtB really .ere intended to 
be allllOD7 and theretore subJeot to the oontinued power ot the 
oourt to modttJ thea upon app11catlon theretor. Th1a. naturally. 
lead. to turther aorutlD7 by the appall. te oourts whloh may. 1t 
they tee1 so adv1sed. reverse or attlrlD the conoluslon reached 
1n the tr1al court. Allot wh1ch loglcally results In endlees 
I1tlsatlon ot a matter .h10h should have been aettled. tlnally 
and conclusively. When the agreement was tlrst approved and 
Incorporated In the dlvorce decrees. 
The Legislature haa. In several sectlons ot the 01vll 
Code (158. 159. 175) provlded that spouses may contract wlth 
each other. In the absence ot traud or overreachlng there Is 
no reason why such contracts may not be glven the dlgnlty 
accorded other contracts. I belleve that once the partles have 
entered into an agreement. whether It purports to dlvlde the 
property. or to provlde tor support and malntenance payments 
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wIthout a dIvIsIon ot the p~~tr. When tound b7 the oourt to be 
fair and equItable. the sUbJeot .hou1d be torever olosed and the 
partIes bound b7 the terms of the1r agreement. IncorporatIon 1n 
the decree only hall the .treot ot .. king the remeq on the 
Judgment and not on the _areement which baa become merged therein. 
In the event the agreement 1s not Inoorporated 1n the decree, the 
remed7 is on the agreement whIch should have the _me b1nding 
ettect as other contracts. 
It i8 my hope that either the present Supreme Court. 
or a later Court. will teel it necessary to straIghten out the 
law on this subject to the end that lawyers may once aga1n know 
how to advise the~ clIents who wish to have their property 
rIghts on separation or divorce conclus1ve17 settled 1n 
accordance with the1r own desires on the subject. It m&7 be 
that the Legislature could add more deta1led provisions on the 
matter ot marital contracts 80 that the courts would not teel 
so tree to ignore the plain intent expressed 1n the sect10ns 
now present in the Code. 
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I am sure most or you Judges and members ot the Bar 
here tonlght who have been tollowlng the reported declslona ot 
the Supreme Court are aware ot the trend In recent years ot the 
Supreme court to U8Urp the functions ot trlen ot tact and 
redeclde both the iasues ot tact and ·issues ot law. In ~ ot 
these cases the issues ot tact have been determined by a jur.y. 
passed upon by the trial court on a motlon tor a new trial. 
afflrmed by the District Court ot Appeal and reversed by the 
Supreme Court wlth trom one to three justices dlssenting. I 
have vigorously opposed this trend because I believe that under 
our system ot Jurisprudence tact flndlng powers are reposed 
exclusively in the trial court. where the Judge and Jur, have an 
opportunIty to hear the witnesses testifY. observe their 
demeanor on the stand and gain ImpressIons that can only be 
gaIned tram personal observation and through the auditory sense. 
These impressions cannot be recorded In a typewrItten or printed 
record. Moreover. the ConstItutIon and statutes ot this state 
conter upon an appellate court power to review questIons ot law 
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alone and whenever an appellate court welghs the evldence and passes 
upon the credlbility ot wItnesses It Is usurping the function 
ot the trial court. 
In a recent case decided b7 tbe Supreme Court ot 
Calltorn1& on JUly 2nd. 1954. I made the toll owing statement in 
my dissentlng opinlons 
"I thlnk It is time that this court should speak more 
frankly In cases ot thIs character and honestly state the baSis 
tor its retusal to recognize the well settled and traditional 
rule with respect to the question ot when there is an issue ot 
tact to be determined. In the case at bar It is obvIous that 
the majority ot thls court has welghed the evIdence and come to 
the conclusIon that It is insufticient to support a tIndlng ot 
undue influence. In so do1og the uajorl ty has vIolated. the 
ConstItutIon ot thIs state in deprivlng the lItIgants in thIs 
case ot their right to a trial by jUl7'. The _jori ty has done 
thIs by substItuting Ita vlew as to the weIght ot the evldence 
tor that ot the jury. the trIal judge. the three members ot the 
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District Court ot Appeal and two members ot th1s court. There 18 
no quest10n 1n mr mind but that the maJor1ty dec1s10n 1n th1s 
case 1s based 'sole11 upon the v1ew that It and not the Jur,r or 
the trial Judge should determine tactual Issues 1n cases ot this 
character. Th18 v1ew 18 in d1rect contl1ot with the Const1tut10n 
and statutes ot this state. and in my op1nlon a Judge ot th18 
oourt who concurs in such a dec1s10n 1s violat1ng hi8 oath ot 
ott1ce." (E8tate ot Welch~ 43 A.C. 113.) 
While it 18 mw pr1vilege. it 18 not my pleasure. to 
write d1ssent1ng opinions. I would muoh preter to concur with 
the maJor1ty or have them concur in op1n10ns prepared by me. 
The preparat10n ot a dissent requires extra effort -- it 18 an 
addit10nal burden and one that I choose to avoid whenever 
possible. But I believe It to be mr solemn duty when the 
maJor1t,r departs trom 8ettled rule8 ot law In renderlng its 
decis10n, to call attention to the error in a dissent1ng opinion 
1n the hope that the error may be oorrected by a 8ubsequent 
decision or by the Legislature. A di8sentlng opinion may a180 
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be helpful in cases which are subject to review by the Supreme 
Court o~ the United States which. in the last tew years, has 
held in accord with aome ot my dissenta and reversed the 
Supreme Court ot calitom1a. 
I do not claim that I have al..,. been right in my 
view ot the law as expressed in mJ dissenting opinions. I may 
have been wrong many times. but I teel it my duty to the people 
o~ California to give them the bene~it o~ my opinion on all 
major i.sues which come before the Supreme Court. Thi. I have 
attempted to do. I claim no credIt -- seek no acclaim or 
recognItion for what I have done or may do in the future. It i • 
., job as I see It. "and as long as I have the physical and mental 
capacity. I shall continue to perform that duty. 
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